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Abstract
It is known that even seemingly small fragments of the %rst-order temporal logic over the
natural numbers are not recursively enumerable. In this paper we show that the monodic (not
monadic, where this result does not hold) fragment is an exception by constructing its %nite
Hilbert-style axiomatization. We also show that the monodic fragment with equality is not re-
cursively axiomatizable. c© 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The %rst-order temporal logic over the natural numbers TL(N) and even its two-
variable monadic fragment are known to be not recursively enumerable (see e.g. [4,8]
and references therein). However, it is shown in [8] that various non-trivial fragments of
TL(N) and other %rst-order temporal logics are decidable. All these fragments operate
only with the so-called monodic formulas.
Denition 1 (Monodic formulas). Let TL be the %rst-order temporal language with
the temporal operators S (‘since’), U (‘until’), © (‘at the next moment’), and ©P
(‘at the previous moment’), but without equality and functional symbols. Denote by
TL1 the set of all TL-formulas ’ such that any subformula of ’ of the form  1S 2,
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 1U 2, © or ©P has at most one free variable. Such formulas are called monodic,
and TL1 is called the monodic fragment of TL.
Here are some examples of monodic formulas, where F and P are the operators
‘some time in the future’ and ‘some time in the past’ expressible via U and S ( F
and P are their duals):
• ∃xF’(x)↔F∃x’(x) (the Barcan formula);
• F∃x (©Old(x)∧¬(SOld(x))) (‘at every moment, someone starts to get old’);
• ∀x F(Sub(x)→© F ¬Sub(x)) (this is a constraint for temporal databases from [2]:
‘an order can be submitted only once’);
• P∃y Works(x; y)∧¬∃y Works(x; y)∧F∃y Works(x; y) (this is a query to a
temporal database from [3]: ‘list all persons who have been unemployed between
jobs’).
The following formula (one more query from [3]) is not monodic:
• P F(¬∃y(Works(x; y)∧©Works(x; y)∧©©Works(x; y))) (‘%nd all job-hoppers
— people who never spent more than two years in one place’).
It turns out that the monodic fragment of TL(N), though undecidable because it con-
tains full %rst-order logic, is recursively enumerable, and moreover can be axiomatized
in a rather natural way. To present such an axiomatization is the main aim of this
paper (Section 2). We show, however, that by adding equality to TL1 we restore the
‘status-quo’: the monodic fragment of TL(N) with equality becomes not recursively
enumerable (Section 3). And, %nally, we note that the monodic Huted fragment (in the
sense of [9,10]) as well as the monodic loosely guarded fragment [12] of many %rst-
order temporal logics are decidable (Section 4), thus extending the list of decidable
fragments from [8].
2. Axiomatization
To make the proofs more transparent, we con%ne ourselves to considering only the
‘future fragment’ of the language TL containing two primitive temporal operators ©
and U. The reader should not have any problems with extending the results to the full
language simply by adding the corresponding ‘past counterparts’. Besides, for purely
technical reasons we slightly change the semantics of U as compared with [8]:
• n |=’U iK there exists k¿n such that k |=  and m |=’ for all m such that
n6m¡k (i.e., m∈ [n; k)).
The ‘until’ from [8] can be de%ned as ©(’U ). (Note that now © is not expressible
via U.)
TL(N) is the set of TL-formulas that are valid in all %rst-order temporal models
with the How of time isomorphic to 〈N;¡〉 and having constant domains and rigid
designators (for a detailed de%nition consult [8]).
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We propose the following axiomatization MON of the monodic fragment of TL(N)
(cf. [5,11,4]):
Axiom schemata (over formulas in TL1)
(cl) the set of axiom schemata from some axiomatization of classical %rst-order logic;
(n1) ©(’→  )→ (©’→© );
(n2) ©¬’↔¬©’;
(n3) ©∀x’↔∀x©’;
(u1) ’U ↔  ∨ (’∧©(’U )).
Inference rules (over formulas in TL1)
(cl) the rules of the axiomatization of classical %rst-order logic;
(n4)
’
©’ ;
(u2)
→¬  ∧©
→¬ (’U ) .
(Here and below we assume ¬, © and ∀ to connect stronger than ∧, ∨, and U, which
in turn are stronger than → and ↔.)
Denote by  the consequence relation determined by MON.
In the remaining part of this section we will be proving the following:
Theorem 2. For every monodic TL-formula ’, we have ’ i; ’∈TL(N).
It is easy to check the soundness part (⇒) of the theorem. For the only non-
standard thing in MON is the rule (u2). Suppose = →¬  ∧© is in TL(N),
but = →¬(’U ) is not. Consider a model of TL(N) refuting . Then there is a
moment n such that n |=  and n |=’U , i.e., there exists k¿n for which k |=  and
m |=’ for all m∈ [n; k). As  is valid in the model, l |=  whenever l¿n. But then
k |=¬  , which is a contradiction.
To prove the completeness part, we can show that if  ’ then there is a model
based on N and refuting ’, or, to put it another way, we can show that if  ¬’ —
i.e., ’ is consistent with MON — then ’ is satis%able in a model of TL(N). Thus, we
need some means of constructing models. As in [8], we will be using for this purpose
quasi-models, appropriately modi%ed for the needs of this proof. (To make the paper
self-contained we shall repeat the required de%nitions from [8].)
For a TL-formula ’, let
©¬{’} = sub’ ∪ {¬ :  ∈ sub’} ∪ {©¬ :  ∈ sub’};
where sub’ is the set of all subformulas of ’. Denote by subn ’ the subset of ©¬{’}
containing formulas with 6n free variables. Without loss of generality we may assume
that ©¬{’} is closed under negation, at least modulo the equivalences ¬¬ ↔  and
(n2). By con’ we denote the set of individual constants occurring in ’. In what follows
we will not be distinguishing between a %nite set  of formulas and the conjunction∧
 of formulas in it.
Let x be a variable not occurring in ’. Put
subx ’= { {x=y}:  (y) ∈ sub1 ’}:
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Denition 3 (Type). A type for ’ is any Boolean-saturated subset t of subx ’, i.e.,
•  ∧ ∈ t iK  ∈ t and ∈ t, for every  ∧ ∈ subx ’;
• ¬  ∈ t iK  =∈ t, for every  ∈ subx ’.
We say that two types t and t′ agree on sub0 ’ if t ∩ sub0 ’= t′ ∩ sub0 ’. Given a
type t for ’ and a constant c∈ con’, the pair 〈t; c〉 is called an indexed type for ’
(indexed by c).
Denition 4 (State candidate). Suppose that T is a set of types for ’ that agree on
sub0 ’, and Tcon a set containing, for each c∈ con’, one indexed type 〈t; c〉 such that
t ∈T . Then the pair C= 〈T; T con〉 is called a state candidate for ’. A pointed state
candidate for ’ is a pair P= 〈C; t〉, where C= 〈T; T con〉 is a state candidate for ’ and
t a type in T . We also say that P is the state candidate based on C with point t.
Given a state candidate C= 〈T; T con〉 for ’ and a pointed state candidate P= 〈C; t〉,
we put
C =
∧
t∈T
∃xt(x) ∧ ∀x
∨
t∈T
t(x) ∧
∧
〈t; c〉∈Tcon
t(c);
P = C ∧ t:
Say that C (or P) is consistent if the formula C (respectively, P) is consistent with
MON.
Denition 5 (Suitable pairs). (1) A pair (t1; t2) of types for ’ is called suitable if the
formula t1 ∧©t2 is consistent with MON.
(2) A pair of state candidates (C1;C2) is suitable if C1 ∧©C2 is consistent with
MON. In this case we write C1≺C2.
(3) A pair P1 = 〈C1; t1〉, P2 = 〈C2; t2〉 of pointed state candidates for ’ is called
suitable if the formula P1 ∧©P2 is consistent with MON. In this case we write
P1≺P2.
(4) Let c∈ con’. A pair P1 = 〈C1; t1〉, P2 = 〈C2; t2〉 of pointed state candidates
for ’ is called suitable for c if it is suitable and 〈t1; c〉 ∈T con1 , 〈t2; c〉 ∈T con2 , where
Ci = 〈Ti; T coni 〉, i=1; 2. In this case we write P1≺cP2.
Denition 6 (Run). Let Q=(Cn = 〈Tn; T conn 〉 : n∈N) be a sequence of state candidates
for ’. A run in Q is a map r associating with every n∈N a type r(n) in Tn in such
a way that the following holds:
• the pairs (r(n); r(n+ 1)) are suitable for all n∈N;
• for every U ∈ sub’, we have U ∈ r(n) iK there exists m¿n such that  ∈ r(m)
and ∈ r(k) for all k ∈ [n; m).
Denition 7 (Quasi-model). A sequence Q=(Cn = 〈Tn; T conn 〉 : n∈N) of state candi-
dates for ’ is called a quasi-model for ’ if
• the pairs (Cn;Cn+1) are suitable for all n∈N;
• for every n∈N and every type t in Tn there exists a run r in Q such that r(n)= t;
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• for every constant c, the function rc de%ned by rc(n)= t, for 〈t; c〉 ∈T conn , n∈N, is
a run in Q.
Say that ’ is satis@ed in Q if there are n∈N and a type t in Tn such that ’∈ t.
Lemma 8. If a monodic sentence ’ is satis@ed in a quasi-model for ’, then it is
satis@able.
Proof. The proof is almost the same as the corresponding part of the proof of Theo-
rem 14 in [8]. The only diKerence is that now we are not given that the state candidates
in Q are realizable. We know; however, that every state candidate Ci is consistent with
MON, and so there is a %rst-order model realizing Ci (subformulas of the form © 
and U that are not in the scope of another temporal operator are treated as unary
predicates or propositional variables). The remaining part is precisely the same as that
of the proof mentioned above.
Thus, to prove Theorem 2, it suNces to show that a sentence ’ is satis%ed in a
quasi-model whenever ’ is consistent.
The next two lemmas show some properties of suitable pairs.
Lemma 9. (i) Suppose (t1; t2) is a suitable pair of types for ’. If © ∈ t1, then  ∈ t2.
If U ∈ t1, then either  ∈ t1 or ∈ t1 and U ∈ t2.
(ii) Suppose (C1;C2) is a suitable pair of state candidates, C1 = 〈T1; T con1 〉 and
C2 = 〈T2; T con2 〉. Then
• for every t1 ∈T1 there exists a t2 ∈T2 such that the pair (t1; t2) is suitable;
• for every t2 ∈T2 there exists a t1 ∈T1 such that (t1; t2) is suitable, and
• if 〈t1; c〉 ∈T con1 and 〈t2; c〉 ∈T con2 , then the pair (t1; t2) is suitable.
Proof. (i) Suppose © ∈ t1, but  =∈ t2. Then ¬ ∈ t2. Since t1 ∧©t2 is consistent
(and © distributes over ∧), the formula © ∧©¬ is also consistent, which is
impossible.
Suppose now that U ∈ t1. In view of (u1) and consistency of t1, we then have
either  ∈ t1 or ;©(U )∈ t1. And as we have just shown, if ©(U )∈ t1 then
U ∈ t2.
(ii) Assume that there is t1 ∈T1 such that none of the pairs (t1; t2), for t2 ∈T2, is
suitable. It follows that
 t1 →©
∧
t2∈T2
¬t2
from which
 ∃xt1 → ∃ x©
∧
t2∈T2
¬t2
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and so, by (n2) and (n3)
 ¬
(
∃xt1 ∧©∀x
∨
t2∈T2
t2
)
contrary to (C1;C2) being suitable.
Now suppose that there is t2 ∈T2 such that none of the pairs (t1; t2), for t1 ∈T1, is
suitable. Then
 ∃x© t2 → ∃x¬
∨
t1∈T1
t1;
which is equivalent to
 ¬
(
∀x
∨
t1∈T1
t1 ∧ ∃x© t2
)
;
contrary to (C1;C2) being suitable.
Finally, assume that 〈t1; c〉 ∈T con1 and 〈t2; c〉 ∈T con2 . Then t1(c)∧©t2(c) is consistent,
and so the pair (t1; t2) is suitable.
Lemma 10. (i) For every consistent state candidate C1 for ’, there is a state candi-
date C2 for ’ such that C1≺C2.
(ii) For every consistent pointed state candidate P1 = 〈C1; t1〉 and every state can-
didate C2 for ’ such that C1≺C2, there is a pointed state candidate P2 = 〈C2; t2〉 for
’ such that P1≺P2.
(iii) Let c∈ con’. For every consistent pointed state candidate P1 = 〈C1; t1〉 for ’
with 〈t1; c〉 ∈T con1 and every state candidate C2 such that C1≺C2, we have P1≺cP2 =
〈C2; t2〉, where 〈t2; c〉 ∈T con2 .
Proof. (i) Denote by ’ the disjunction of formulas C, for all state candidates C
for ’. As ’ is clearly true in all classical %rst-order models (subformulas of the
form © (x) or (x)U (x) are treated as unary predicates), we have  ’ and ©’.
Therefore, C1 ∧©’ is consistent, and so there must be a state candidate C2 such that
C1 ∧©C2 is consistent.
(ii) is easy; we leave it to the reader as an exercise.
(iii) Suppose that 〈t1; c〉 ∈T con1 and C1≺C2. Let 〈t2; c〉 ∈T con2 . Then P1≺cP2, where
P2 = 〈C2; t2〉, for otherwise we would have
 C1 ∧ t1 → ¬© (C2 ∧ t2)
and so
 C1 ∧ t1(c)→ ¬© (C2 ∧ t2(c));
i.e.,  C1 →¬©C2 , which is a contradiction.
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Suppose P0 = 〈C0; t0〉 is a consistent pointed state candidate for ’ and U ∈ t0.
Suppose also that P0; : : : ;Pn, for some n¿0, is a sequence of pointed state candidates
Pi = 〈Ci ; ti〉 such that
P0 ≺ P1 ≺ · · · ≺ Pn
and there exists k6n such that  ∈ tk and ∈ ti for all i∈ [0; k). Then we say that this
sequence realizes U in t0. If for some c∈ con’
P0 ≺c P1 ≺c · · · ≺c Pn
then we say that the sequence P0; : : : ;Pn c-realizes U in t0.
Lemma 11. For every consistent pointed state candidate P0 = 〈C0; t0〉 and every for-
mula U ∈ t0, there is a sequence P0; : : : ;Pn realizing U in t0. Moreover, if
〈t0; c〉 ∈T con0 then we can @nd a sequence P0; : : : ;Pn which c-realizes U in t0.
Proof. Suppose otherwise. As P0 is consistent, we have
 P0 → ¬(U ): (1)
Let S be the minimal set of pointed state candidates for ’ such that
• P0 ∈S and
• if D1∈S and D1≺D2, then D2 ∈S.
Consider the (non-empty) disjunction
# =
∨
D∈S
D:
Note %rst that
 # → ¬ : (2)
Indeed, otherwise the formula #∧  is consistent, and so∨
D∈S
(D ∧  )
is consistent as well. Hence there is D∈T such that D ∧  is consistent, which
means, in particular, that  is in the point t of D (for otherwise ¬ ∈ t and D ∧  
cannot be consistent). Thus we have a sequence
P0 ≺ P1 ≺ · · · ≺ Pn
such that Pi = 〈Ci ; ti〉 and  ∈ tn. As all pairs (ti; ti+1); 06i¡n, are suitable, it fol-
lows from Lemma 9(i) that the sequence P0; : : : ;Pn realizes U , contrary to our
assumption. Thus, we have (2).
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Let us show now that
 # →©#: (3)
If this is not the case then the formula #∧ ©¬# is consistent, and so there is D∈S
such that D ∧ ©¬# is consistent. By Lemma 10(i) and (ii), we have a pointed state
candidate E for which D≺E. But then E∈S and D ∧ © E is consistent, contrary
to consistency of D ∧ ©
∧
C∈S ¬C. Thus, we have (3).
It follows from (2), (3), and (u2) that  # → ¬(’U ). As P0 is a disjunct of #,
we then have
 P0 → ¬(U )
contrary to (1).
The existence of a c-realizing sequence is proved analogously.
Lemma 12. Suppose ’ is a monodic sentence consistent with MON. Then ’ is sat-
is@ed in a quasi-model for ’.
Proof. Let ’ be the disjunction of formulas P, for all pointed state candidates for
’. Clearly,  ’, and so ’∧ ’ is consistent. Then we have a consistent pointed
state candidate 〈C0; t0〉 such that ’∈ t0. C0 will be the starting state candidate in the
quasi-model Q=(Ci = 〈Ti; T coni 〉: i∈N) to be constructed.
Take some t ∈T0 and U ∈ t. The pointed state candidate 〈C0; t〉 is clearly consis-
tent. So, by Lemma 11, there is a sequence of pointed state candidates
〈C0; t〉 ≺ 〈C1; t1〉 ≺ · · · ≺ 〈Ck ; tk〉 (4)
realizing U in t. Next we take another formula ′U ′∈ t, if any, which is not
realized in this sequence. In this case, by Lemma 9(i), we have ′U ′∈ tk . Using
Lemma 11 once again, we extend (4) to
〈C0; t〉 ≺ 〈C1; t1〉 ≺ · · · ≺ 〈Ck ; tk〉 ≺ · · · ≺ 〈Cl; tl〉 (5)
realizing ′U ′ in t. Following this way, we can construct a sequence of the form (5)
realizing all formulas of the form U in t. Let (5) be such a sequence.
Now take another type t′ ∈T0. By Lemma 10(ii), there are types t′i ∈Ti; 0¡i6l,
such that
〈C0; t′〉 ≺ 〈C1; t′1〉 ≺ · · · ≺ 〈Cl; t′l〉:
In precisely the same manner as before we extend this sequence to realize all formulas
of the form U in t′. After that we consider yet another type t′′ ∈T0, and so forth.
When all types are exhausted, we will have a sequence of state candidates C0; : : : ;Cn.
(If no type in C0 contains formulas of the form U , we take a state candidate C1
such that the pair (C0;C1) is suitable and put Cn =C1.)
We did not yet take care of the constants. So suppose 〈t; c〉 ∈T con0 and U ∈ t.
Pick the ti ∈Ti with 〈ti; c〉 ∈Tconi , for 16i6n. By Lemma 10(iii) we have
〈C0; t〉 ≺c 〈C1; t1〉 ≺c · · · ≺c 〈Cn; tn〉: (6)
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If ’U is not c-realized by this sequence in t, then ’U ∈ tn. By Lemma 10(i) and
(iii) we can extend (6) to
〈C0; t〉 ≺c 〈C1; t1〉 ≺c · · · ≺c 〈Cn; tn〉 ≺c · · · ≺c 〈Cn′ ; tn′〉 (7)
with  ∈ tn′ . Next we take another 〈t′; d〉∈T con0 and ′U ′∈ t′ which is not d-realized
by the sequence
〈C0; t′〉 ≺d 〈C1; t′1〉 ≺d · · · ≺d 〈Cn; t′n〉 ≺d · · · ≺d 〈Cn′ ; t′n′〉; (8)
where t′i is the point with 〈t′i ; d〉∈T coni , 16i6n′. We extend (8) so that ′U ′ is
d-realized in the new sequence. After that we consider yet another pair 〈t′′; c′′〉 and
′′U ′′, and so forth. When all pairs 〈t; c〉 ∈T con0 and all U ∈ t are exhausted, we
have a sequence C0; : : : ;Cm.
Then we consider the types and constants from Cm and construct a sequence Cm; : : : ;
Cm′ as if Cm were C0. After that we take care of Cm′ , and so on.
It is readily seen (using Lemma 9) that the resulting in%nite sequence Q is a quasi-
model for ’.
This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
3. Monodicity and equality
So far we have considered the %rst-order temporal language TL without equality
and functional symbols. A natural question is whether our decidability and axioma-
tizability results concerning the class of monodic formulas can be generalized to the
language with these ingredients. It should be clear that functional symbols easily de-
stroy nice properties of the monodic formulas: in the proof of Theorem 2 from [8] we
can replace Q2(y) and Pj(y) with Q2(f(x)) and Pj(f(x)), respectively, thus obtaining
a monodic–monadic one-variable formula ’T, associated with a %nite set of tiles T,
such that ’T is satis%able iK T recurrently tiles N×N. So the class of such formulas
cannot be recursively enumerable.
In this section we show that by adding equality we also ‘spoil’ the monodic fragment.
Namely, we are going to prove that the monodic fragment TL=1 with equality is not
recursively axiomatizable.
Let us %x a unary predicate P and denote by  the conjunction of the following
formulas:
∃xP(x) ∧ ∀x∀y(P(x) ∧ P(y)→ x = y); (9)
+
F ∀x(P(x)→©P(x)); (10)
+
F ∀x∀y(©P(x) ∧©P(y) ∧ ¬P(x) ∧ ¬P(y)→ x = y); (11)
F∀x(P(x)↔FP(x)): (12)
Here +F means ‘now and always in the future’, i.e.,
+
F’=¬(U¬’).
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The reader can readily check that the following lemma holds.
Lemma 13. For every model M= 〈〈N;¡〉; D; I〉; we have 0 |=  i; the following con-
ditions are satis@ed:
• |P0|=1;
• ∀n∈N (Pn⊆Pn+1 & |Pn+1 − Pn|61);
• ∃m∈N ∀k¿m Pm =Pk .
(In other words: There is a unique element a0 ∈D for which P(a0) holds true at
moment 0; P(a0) remains true always in the future. At moment 1 there may be only
two elements a0; a1 ∈D for which P is true, at moment 2 only three such elements,
etc. Finally, we eventually reach a moment m starting from which P is stable.)
Suppose now that we are given an arbitrary %rst-order (non-temporal) sentence  
which does not contain occurrences of P. Let Q be a unary predicate not occurring in
 either. Put
′ = ∀x(Q(x)↔P(x))
and denote by  Q the relativization of  to Q (i.e., ’Q=’ for atomic ’, Q commutes
with the Booleans, and (∀x ’)Q =∀x (Q(x)→’Q)). Clearly, all the formulas ; ′,
and  Q are in TL=1 .
Lemma 14. The following conditions are equivalent:
•  is valid in all @nite classical @rst-order models;
•  ∧ ′→  Q is valid in all temporal @rst-order models based on 〈N;¡〉.
Proof. Suppose ∧ ′→  Q is refuted in 〈〈N;¡〉; D; I〉. Without loss of generality we
may assume that 0 |= ∧ ′ and 0 |=  Q. By Lemma 13, Q0 (the set of elements in D
on which Q is true at moment 0) is %nite. Let M be the classical %rst-order model
with domain Q0 and the nary predicates RM ; n¿0, de%ned by taking, for every n-tuple
a1; : : : ; an of elements in Q0,
(a1; : : : ; an) ∈ RM iK (a1; : : : ; an) ∈ R0:
It is easily checked by induction that for every assignment a in Q0 and every classical
%rst-order formula #, we have 0 |=a #Q iK M |=a #. It follows that the %nite model M
refutes  .
Conversely, suppose that M is a %nite %rst-order model refuting  and having do-
main D= {a0; : : : ; an}. De%ne a temporal model 〈〈N;¡〉; D; I〉 in such a way that I(0)
interprets the predicate symbols in  by the same predicates as in M , Q0 =D, and for
every i∈N,
Pi =
{ {a0; : : : ; ai} if i 6 n;
D if i ¿ n:
It follows from Lemma 13 that 0 |= ∧ ′, and clearly we have 0 |=  Q.
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Now recall that by Trakhtenbrot’s theorem (see, e.g. [1]) the set of %rst-order
classical formulas that are valid in %nite models is not recursively enumerable. As a
consequence we obtain the following:
Theorem 15. The set of TL=1 -formulas that are valid in all temporal models based
on 〈N;¡〉 is not recursively enumerable, and so not recursively axiomatizable.
It is not clear, however, whether the decidable fragments of %rst-order temporal logics
found in [8] and below remain decidable after extending the language with equality. 1
4. Two more decidable fragments
As was shown in [8], the two-variable monodic-fragment, the monadic–monodic
fragment, and the guarded monodic fragment of many %rst-order temporal logics are
decidable. Here we extend this list by observing that the monodic fragment can be
naturally combined with the Huted fragment of classical %rst-order logic, which was
shown to be decidable and to have the %nite model property in [9,10].
Let Xm =(x1; : : : ; xm) be a list of individual variables.
Denition 16 (Fluted formulas). An atomic Auted formula over Xi is an atom of the
form P(xk ; xk+1; : : : ; xi) for some k6i. Fluted formulas are now de%ned inductively as
follows:
• any atomic Huted formula over Xi is a Huted formula over Xi;
• if ’ is a Huted formula over Xi+1, then both ∃xi+1’ and ∀xi+1’ are Huted formulas
over Xi;
• any Boolean combination of Huted formulas over Xi is a Huted formula over Xi;
• if ’ and  are Huted formulas over Xi then ’U , ’S , ©’, and ©P’ are Huted
formulas over Xi.
Finally, we say a formula is Auted if it is Huted over Xi for some i∈N.
Denote by FLU the set of all Huted formulas of our %rst-order temporal language.
Theorem 17. Let F be any of the following classes of Aows of time:
• {〈N;¡〉};
• {〈Z;¡〉};
• {〈Q;¡〉};
• the class of all @nite strict linear orders;
• any @rst-order-de@nable class of strict linear orders,
1 We have been just informed by Degtyarev and Lisitsa that the (decidable) monadic two-variable fragment
of TL1 becomes not recursively enumerable if extended with equality.
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and let F+ range over these and {〈R;¡〉}. Then the fragments
TL(F) ∩TL1 ∩FLU and TL@n(F+) ∩TL1 ∩FLU
are decidable.
Proof. In view of Theorems 15, 36 and Corollary 37 of [8], and the results of [9,10],
it is enough to show that if ’ is a Huted monodic formula and C= 〈T; T con〉 a state
candidate for ’, then the formula
∧
t∈T
∃x Pt(x) ∧ ∀x
∨
t∈T
Pt(x) ∧
∧
〈t;c〉∈Tcon
Pt(c)
is equivalent to a Huted sentence. But this is almost obvious: by only renaming variables
in formulas from subx ’, we can rewrite all of them as Huted (classical) formulas over
X1 with at most one free variable x1.
As was observed by Hodkinson (see [7]), Theorem 74 of [8] can be extended to the
loosely guarded fragment introduced in [12].
Denition 18 (Loosely guarded fragment). Denote byTLGF the smallest set ofTL-
formulas such that
• every atomic formula is in TLGF;
• if ’ and  are in TLGF, then so are ’∧  , ¬’, ’S , ’U , ©’, and ©P’;
• if
◦ * is a conjunction of atoms,
◦ ’∈TLGF,
◦ every free variable of ’ occurs in *, and
◦ for some tuple Py of variables in *, if y∈ Py and x is a variable in * diKerent from
y then there is a conjunct of * containing both x and y, then ∃ Py(*∧’)∈TLGF.
The set TLGF is called the loosely guarded fragment of the %rst-order temporal
language.
Using the fact that the loosely guarded fragment of classical %rst-order logic is decid-
able [12,6] and has the %nite model property [7], and following the proof of Theorem 74
of [8], one can readily prove the following:
Theorem 19. Let F and F+ be as in Theorem 17. Then the fragments
TL(F) ∩TL1 ∩TLGF and TL@n(F+) ∩TL1 ∩TLGF
are decidable.
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